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STUDENT RIGHTS UP IN SMOKE:
THE SUPREME COURT'S CLOUDED JUDGMENT IN MORSE
V. FREDERICK
Jeremy Jorgensen
In recent years, the rights of public school students have
dwindled, primarily in the areas of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure, and First Amendment freedom of speech. This is due, in
large part, to the conservative trend the Supreme Court has taken
and the scary times in which we live, fraught with incidents of threats
on school campuses, school shootings, and other violent acts. The
end result is that public school students, within the schoolhouse
gates, are stripped of rights once deemed sacrosanct to the Founders
of this Nation. The Supreme Court's rationale for the circumscrip-
tion of student rights is to protect the students and is grounded in the
doctrine ofparens partriae. Although the Supreme Court's objective
has been accomplished, we must ask ourselves at what cost? Stu-
dents in public schools are now required to pass through metal detec-
tors and are subjected to random locker searches and drug tests.
Student no longer possess the right to freedom of speech; and
schools, once regarded as the "marketplace of ideas," have now be-
come "enclaves of totalitarianism." It seems as though the school
system has become increasingly similar to the prison system. This
Article suggests the Supreme Court's objectives can be accomplished
in a less restrictive manner while still keeping the safety of our chil-
dren paramount. The Article will provide a history of student speech
jurisprudence in order to further analyze these recent decisions and
trends. This Article will also provide a thorough, in-depth analysis of
Morse v. Frederick, a recent Supreme Court decision curtailing pub-
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lic school student's First Amendment rights. This Article will attempt
to exemplify how the Supreme Court has detracted from its prior
"'speech protective" decisions and show how the Court is adopting
instead, deferential standards that grant school authorities unbridled
authority to censor speech. Additionally, this Article will address just
how far school authorities' disciplinary power should extend off-
campus. With the advent of the Internet and many social utility web-
sites such as America Online, MySpace, and Facebook many students
have been disciplined for their online activities. This Article predicts
that the dicta and holding of Morse v. Frederick will be used by
courts, not only to censor speech that can reasonably be regarded as
encouraging illegal drug use, but also to censor speech occurring
off-campus, including speech posted on these social utility websites.
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STUDENT RIGHTS UP IN SMOKE:
THE SUPREME COURT'S CLOUDED JUDGMENT IN MORSE
V. FREDERICK
INTRODUCTION
Generally, this Article will provide a current overview of pub-
lic school students' First Amendment rights, and demonstrate that the
prevailing standards for evaluating them are inadequate. It will dis-
cuss how the Supreme Court has effectively limited the application of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District'
through the exceptions created in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,2 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier3 and Morse v. Fre-
derick.4 Specifically, this Article will focus on the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Morse, which illustrates the Court's curtailment of
student speech.
Part I of this Article will summarize the history and evolution
of the Supreme Court's decisions involving students' First Amend-
ment rights. Part II will provide a synopsis of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Morse. Part III will discuss the problems with First
Amendment jurisprudence as it applies to students and demonstrate
the Court has adopted deferential standards that offer students little or
no protection. Additionally, it will show that Tinker has become the
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
4 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
[Vol. 25742
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STUDENT RIGHTS UP IN SMOKE
exception instead of the rule to be applied in student speech cases.5
Moreover, it will establish that the standard enunciated in Tinker is
well suited to evaluate all student speech cases, and the Supreme
Court's decisions following Tinker are unnecessary additions to First
Amendment case law. Part IV will scrutinize the dangers of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Morse v. Frederick and the various ways in
which lower courts may erroneously interpret the decision. Lastly,
Part V will propose a remedy the courts could implement to avoid
discrepant and incongruent decisions.
It is important to note the purpose of this Article is not to ar-
gue that public schools should be prohibited from suppressing speech
that encourages illegal drug use. Schools should have the authority to
censor speech causing a material and substantial disruption;6 speech
that is lewd, vulgar and indecent;7 speech that "bear[s] the imprimatur
of the school;",8 and speech that condones or sanctions illegal drug
use.9 However, this authority cannot be boundless and must be con-
stricted in order to prevent the First Amendment from "exist[ing] in
principle but not in fact."' Morse's consistency with the Supreme
Court's two prior student speech cases, Fraser and Kuhlmeier,
evinces that the Court has no stopping point, and is poised to further
circumscribe the few remaining rights students possess." Tinker
5 See id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has ... scaled back Tinker's
standard, or rather set the standard aside on an ad hoc basis.").
6 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
7 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
8 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
9 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
10 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
11 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629-37 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("As originally understood,
2009]
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enunciated the standard to be used when evaluating student rights,
yet, in subsequent decisions the Court has consistently detracted from
its holding.' 2 Furthermore, while Morse may appear as a narrow ex-
ception to the holding of Tinker, it has broad implications.'
3
I. HISTORY OF STUDENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." "4 De-
spite this constitutional mandate, the current status of freedom of
speech within the public school system is cause for much concern.
Student speech is surreptitiously being curtailed through the adoption
of deferential standards ill equipped to evaluate fundamental rights.
This trend is exemplified by the gradual erosion of the overarching,
"speech protective" standard established in Tinker, through the crea-
tion of several amorphous exceptions which emanated from the Su-
preme Court's subsequent decisions.'5
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District
Tinker, decided in 1969, was the first of a trilogy of cases that
would comprise the standard for evaluating students' freedom of
the Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools.").
2 Id. at 2634. See id. at 2622, 2629, Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273, and Fraser, 478 U.S. at
685, for exceptions to the standard articulated in Tinker.
13 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 423, 430
(2007) ("Although the Court's holding was narrow, the decision's implications are broad,
and indicate greater judicial deference to schools when they want to suppress student
speech.").
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights At The
Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 527, 530 (2000) (referring to
the majority opinion in Tinker as the "speech protective model").
[Vol. 25
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STUDENT RIGHTS UP IN SMOKE
speech rights in a school setting.' 6 The Court in Tinker addressed
whether the suspension of several students, who silently protested the
Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school in contravention
of the school's policy, violated their First Amendment rights.
17
Grappling with the issue, the Court observed the distinct nature of the
school environment, but declared that both students and teachers re-
tain their First Amendment rights.' 8 Examining precedent, the Court
made the most oft-quoted and renowned pronouncement in student
speech cases stating, "[ilt can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate."' 9 In support of this position the
Court affirmed, "[t]his has been the unmistakable holding of this
Court for almost 50 years.
20
In reaching this decision, the Court took note of the delicate
balance that must be maintained in the school environment by de-
scribing the tension that exists between adhering to the rights embod-
ied in the First Amendment and sustaining the authority of school of-
ficials.2 1 The Court opined that the silent, passive, political speech at
issue was analogous to pure speech, and therefore entitled to the ut-
16 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (holding students retain First Amendment rights while on
school premises unless such speech causes significant interference with "the operation of the
school").
17 Id. at 504-05.
18 Id. at 506 ("First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students.").
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 ("Our problem lies in the area where students in the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.").
2009]
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22most protection. Furthermore, the prohibited speech did not cause
interference with the work of the school or infringe upon the rights of
others.23 Despite the district court's ruling-that the action taken by
school officials was reasonable due to trepidation that the armbands
would cause a disruption-the Supreme Court found in favor of the
students and reversed the holding of the lower court stating, "undif-
ferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression., 24 The Court focused on the
fact that any deviation from the norm has the potential to instill fear.25
Because the record was devoid of any evidence which would lead
school officials to believe the armbands had the capability of causing
a disruption, the Court held that "where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate disci-
pline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sus-
tained. 26
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
In 1986, the Supreme Court's decision in Fraser marked the
beginning of the retreat from the holding of Tinker by creating the
first exception.27 In Fraser, a student was suspended and barred from
speaking at the school's commencement ceremony because he deliv-




26 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
27 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86 (holding the First Amendment does not protect speech that
is obscene, vulgar, lewd, or indecent when disseminated on school premises).
[Vol. 25
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ered a sexually-suggestive speech nominating a classmate for a posi-
tion on the student government.28 Consequently, the student filed suit
seeking an injunction and monetary damages asserting his First
Amendment rights had been violated. 29 The district court held in fa-
vor of the student and the appellate court affirmed.30  The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine "whether the First Amendment
prevents a school district from disciplining a high school student for
giving a lewd speech at a school assembly., 31 The Court deferred to
the authority of school officials and proclaimed that "[t]he determina-
tion of what manner of speech... is inappropriate properly rests with
the school board., 32 Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court
abandoned Tinker's substantial disruption test and held that censoring
the student's sexually insinuative speech did not contravene the First
Amendment. 33 In reaching this result, the Court explained, "constitu-
tional rights of students in public school are not automatically coex-
28 Id. at 677-79. See also id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring):
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt,
his character is firm-but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students
of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and
pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He
doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing un-
til finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-
even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for
A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the best our
high school can be.
(internal quotations omitted).
29 Id. at 679.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 677.
32 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
33 Id. at 685 ("We hold that petitioner School District acted entirely within its permissible
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tensive with the rights of adults in other settings., 34 Additionally, by
declining to apply the standard enunciated in Tinker, the Court im-
plicitly found Tinker's application to be wanting in certain situations.
It reasoned that the school districts need to be given wide latitude to
discipline students in numerous unforeseeable situations.35
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
The second exception to Tinker emerged in Kuhimeier, de-
cided less than two years after Fraser, in 1988.36 In Kuhimeier, for-
mer student staff members of the school newspaper filed suit against
the school and several school officials alleging their constitutional
rights were infringed when the principal edited two pages from their
school-sponsored newspaper.37  The newspaper was funded by the
Board of Education, but the costs were offset by revenue generated
from the newspaper sales.38 The principal removed segments of the
article due to what he perceived to be inappropriate subject matter,
and concern for the well-being of the students referred to in the arti-
cle.39 The district court held in favor of the school officials, conclud-
34 Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)).
35 Id. at 686. See also Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627 ("Fraser established that the mode of
analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.").
36 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (holding the First Amendment does not protect speech that
may reasonably be perceived as school-sponsored).
" Id. at 262.
38 Id. at 262-63.
39 Id. at 263-64. One of the articles focused on teen pregnancy, sex, and the use of birth
control while the other discussed the topic of divorce. Id. at 263. Although the article on
teen pregnancy did not refer to the students within the school by their real names, the princi-
pal was concerned that due to limited number pregnant students, the subjects of the article
would be easily identifiable. Id. The principal was apprehensive about the divorce article
because the parents who were the focus of the article were not given a chance to rebut the
comments made by the student regarding their divorce. Id.
748 [Vol. 25
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ing that a school newspaper is "an integral part of the school's educa-
tional function," and the circumscription of student speech within that
medium is proper, provided it is motivated by "a substantial and rea-
sonable basis. '40 Reversing the decision of the district court, the
court of appeals held the school newspaper constituted a public fo-
rum, and speech within it could only be suppressed when "necessary
to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or
discipline ... or the rights of others.",41 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address "whether the First Amendment requires a school
affirmatively to promote particular student speech., 42 Reversing the
findings of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court adhered to the
deferential standard set forth in Fraser.43 The Court stated, "[a]
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
'basic educational mission.' ,44 Finding the school officials never in-
tended the newspaper to be a public forum, the Court concluded it
was subject to regulation by school officials. 45  The Court distin-
guished the speech at issue in Tinker from school-sponsored speech,
and reasoned that school officials should be given more latitude to
censor speech "the public might reasonably perceive to bear the im-
40 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1463 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (quoting
Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
41 Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. at 265 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511).
42 Id. at 266, 270-71.
41 Id. at 266-67 ("We thus recognized that '[t]he determination of what manner of speech
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board,'
rather than with the federal courts."). The Court continued by adding, "[t]his [deferential]
standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is
primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not
of federal judges." Id. at 273.
" Id. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
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primatur of the school. 46 The Court held that "educators do not of-
fend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. 47
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION
A. Morse v. Frederick
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Morse, its fourth case
dealing with students' First Amendment rights. The Court held
"schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care
from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal
drug use. 48
In Morse, a student was suspended by his principal for dis-
playing a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at an Olympic
Torch Relay in Juneau, Alaska.49 The student, Frederick, proceeded
to challenge the suspension administratively. 50 However, the super-
intendent of the school district upheld Frederick's suspension, and
concluded he was not suspended because the school disagreed with
the message conveyed on his banner, but rather because the speech
advocated the use of illicit substances. 51 Subsequently, Frederick
filed suit in district court claiming the principal and the school board
46 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-7 1.
47 Id. at 273.
48 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
" Id. at 2622.
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infringed upon his First Amendment rights.52 The district court ruled
in favor of Principal Morse and the school board finding that Princi-
pal Morse's interpretation of the banner-that it advocated the use of
illegal drugs-was reasonable and imposed upon her a duty to pre-
vent the message from being disseminated at a school-sanctioned
event.5 3 Reversing the decision of the district court, the Ninth Circuit
utilized the standard implemented in Tinker, and held Frederick's
First Amendment rights had been abridged because the school disci-
plined him despite being unable to show his speech was likely to
cause a substantial disruption.54 The Ninth Circuit also opined that
Principal Morse was not entitled to receive qualified immunity be-
cause "Frederick's right to display his banner was so 'clearly estab-
lished' that a reasonable principal in Morse's position would have
understood that her actions were unconstitutional. 55 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Frederick's First
Amendment rights were violated when Principal Morse confiscated
his banner and if so, whether Principal Morse should receive quali-
fied immunity for her actions.56
The Court began its analysis by confirming this was a student
speech case, thereby rendering any precedent outside the realm of
student speech inapplicable.57 The Court concluded that it was a
52 Id.
53 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
54 Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006).
55 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623-24 (quoting Frederick, 439 F.3d. at 1123-25).
56 Id. at 2624.
57 Id. This determination is of the utmost significance because if the Court had not labeled
the event as being school-sanctioned, Frederick would be viewed as an adult, since he was
eighteen years of age, exercising his right to free speech in a public forum, thereby entitling
him to the utmost protection under the First Amendment. This case would then fall outside
2009]
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school-sanctioned event due to the fact that the Olympic Torch Relay
took place directly across the street from the school, was supervised
by faculty members, and was attended by the school band and cheer-
leaders, .58 The Court stated that "[u]nder these circumstances, we
agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot 'stand in the
midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-
sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.' ,59
In determining whether the message displayed on Frederick's
banner advocated illegal conduct or was merely an innocuous state-
ment, the Supreme Court conceded that the meaning of Frederick's
banner was elusive. 60 However, the Court deferred to and, in fact,
supported Principal Morse's interpretation of the banner.6' The Court
stated:
At least two interpretations of the words on the banner
demonstrate that the sign advocated the use of illegal
drugs. First, the phrase could be interpreted as an im-
perative: "[Take] bong hits . . ."-a message equiva-
lent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to "smoke
marijuana" or "use an illegal drug." Alternatively, the
phrase could be viewed as celebrating drug use-
"bong hits [are a good thing]," or "[we take] bong
hits"-and we discern no meaningful distinction be-
tween celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of fel-
low students and outright advocacy or promotion.62
the realm of student-speech precedents altogether, instead being governed by First Amend-




60 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
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After concluding the most plausible meaning of Frederick's
banner was to sanction illegal drug use, the Court proceeded to ana-
lyze Frederick's banner under the rubric of prior student speech
cases, only to find that none were suitable to dispose of the issue.63
Addressing Fraser's relevance, the Court acknowledged the standard
utilized in that case was somewhat nebulous.64 Despite this lack of
clarity, the Court affirmed that Fraser stood for two principles: (1)
"the constitutional rights of students in public school are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, 65
and (2) "the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.
66
However, the Court was reluctant to adopt the school board's argu-
ment-to extend the holding of Fraser to encompass speech that of-
fends or contravenes the school's mission-because this analysis
"stretches Fraser too far.",67  The Court also ruled out Kuhimeier,
stating it was inapposite "because no one would reasonably believe
that Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur. ' '68 The Court
then strayed from a First Amendment analysis altogether, circum-
venting Tinker's application by focusing on the severe impact drugs
have on our Nation's youth.69 Relying upon principles derived from
63 Id. at 2625-29.
64 Id. at 2626.
65 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682).
66 Id. at 2627.
67 Id. at 2629.
68 Id. at 2627. But see Murad Hussain, Commentary, The "Bong" Show: Viewing Freder-
ick's Publicity Stunt Through Kuhlmeier's Lens, 116 YALE L.J. 292 (Supp. 2007) (suggest-
ing the Court in Morse could have suppressed Frederick's speech under the standard enunci-
ated in Kuhlmeier).
69 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627-29 ("Tinker warned that schools may not prohibit student
speech because of 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance' or 'a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.'
2009]
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cases that restricted the Fourth Amendment rights of public school
students, the Court noted that "deterring drug use by schoolchildren
is an 'important-indeed, perhaps compelling' interest., 70 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts concluded that the "special characteristics of the school
environment... [coupled with] the governmental interest in stopping
student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression
that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.'
III. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT STANDARDS AND THE
NEED FOR CLARIFICATION, REFINEMENT, AND REFORM
In Abrams v. United States,72 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote, "I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe . . . unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country., 73 In recent years the public school system has in-
creasingly failed to adhere to this sentiment. School districts should
The danger here is far more serious and palpable.") (internal citations omitted).
70 Id. at 2628 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995). But
see id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[fln [the Court's] view, the unusual importance of
protecting children from the scourge of drugs supports a ban on all speech in the school envi-
ronment that promotes drug use."); Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d. 765, 769
(5th Cir. 2007).
[T]he Court did not provide a detailed account of how the particular
harms of a given activity add up to an interest sufficiently compelling to
forego Tinker analysis. As a result of this ambiguity, speech advocating
an activity entailing arguably marginal harms may be included within the
circle of the majority's rule. Political speech in the school setting, the
important constitutional value Tinker sought to protect, could thereby be
compromised by overly-anxious administrators.
Id.
71 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
72 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
73 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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not impulsively censor the speech of their students unless the speech
is likely to cause a substantial disruption and suppression is necessary
to maintain order within the school. The current jurisprudence com-
prising student speech leaves students, while in school, stripped of
rights deemed at one point to be sacrosanct to the people of this na-
tion. These standards are successful at suppressing alternate views
on a topic simply because they are disfavored.74 The deferential
standards which have been implemented by the Supreme Court in its
recent decisions discourage debate and the dissemination of ideas, in-
stead promoting orthodoxy. The United States is run democratically
and school systems that purportedly aim to teach the future of this so-
ciety and inculcate students are charged with the duty of adhering to
the Constitution. This mission is not accomplished if students de-
cline to express a particular point of view on a topic due to fear of be-
ing punished.
A. Justice Black's Dissent in Tinker Has Become the
Prevailing Standard
Dissenting in Tinker, Justice Black argued the Court's holding
transferred the authority to control students from school officials to
the Supreme Court.75 His dissent resonated with the idea that the
Court should defer to the determinations of educational institutions
thereby minimizing judicial oversight and supervision.76 Justice
Black predicated his reasoning on the notion that students do not re-
74 See, e.g., Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618.
75 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 523-24.
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tain First Amendment rights while on school premises.77 Justice
Black also held the belief that "public schools ...are operated to
give students an opportunity to learn, not to talk politics by actual
speech, or by 'symbolic' speech., 78 He compared schools to legisla-
tures, suggesting the majority resurrected the superannuated reason-
ableness evaluation prevalent in the era of Lochner v. New York79
where the Court declined to defer to the judgment of the legislature
and overturned laws it found to be imprudent. 80 Expressing his an-
tipathy with the outcome of Tinker, Justice Black stated that the ma-
jority's holding "surrender[s] control of the American public school
system to public school students." 8
The two diametrically opposed views concerning students'
First Amendment rights are best exemplified in the majority and dis-
senting opinions of Tinker.8 2 Justice Black's dissent, when contrasted
with the majority opinion, makes clear that the entire debate pertain-
ing to student speech concerns the amount of deference granted to
school officials, and the level of scrutiny applied by courts when re-
viewing the constitutionality of school regulations.83
" Id. at 521.
78 Id. at 523-24.
71 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
80 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518-22 (Black, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 526.
82 See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; see also Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 331 (2d Cir.
2006) ("Tinker established a protective standard for student speech under which it cannot be
suppressed based on its content, but only because it is substantially disruptive."); Chemerin-
sky, supra note 15, at 530 (referring to the majority opinion in Tinker as the "speech protec-
tive model," and the dissenting opinion as the "judicial deference model").
83 See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 529 ("The majority's
approach emphasizes the importance of student speech, the limits on school authority, and
the need for judicial review. The dissent by Justice Hugo Black conveys a very different
view, stressing the need for judicial deference to the authority and expertise of school offi-
[Vol. 25
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Over a period spanning forty years, the Court has detracted
from Justice Fortas's majority opinion in Tinker, adhering instead to
Justice Black's dissent which accorded a great deal of deference to
school officials and is synonymous with a rational basis standard.84
This is evinced by the Supreme Court's decisions in Fraser, Kuhl-
meier, and Morse, which represent a gradual departure from the hold-
ing of Tinker.85 All three of these cases are devoid of the central
principles propounded by the Tinker Court. 86  These principles in-
clude "the importance of protecting students' free speech rights, the
need for proof of significant disruption of school activities, and the
role of the judiciary in monitoring schools' decisions to ensure com-
pliance with the Constitution." 87 Lending further support to this no-
tion is the fact that the Court, in subsequent cases, has relied upon,
and even citied to Justice Black's dissent when providing the ration-
ale for its holdings.88
Justice Black's dissent disregards the notion that schools are
meant to be the marketplaces of ideas and offends the spirit of the
First Amendment.89 In order to properly inculcate students, school
officials must advocate free flowing dissemination of ideas that are
both officially approved and disfavored. While surely
cials.").
84 See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 534 ("Reasonableness... connotes the rational ba-
sis test and tremendous deference to the government. Justice Black based this on the need
for deferring to the authority of school officials.").
85 See id. at 530 ("The decisions over the past thirty years are far closer to Justice Black's
dissent in Tinker than they are to Justice Fortas's majority opinion.").
86 See id. at 539, 545.
87 Id. at 539.
88 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)).
89 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
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"[u]ncontrolled and uncontrollable liberty is an enemy to domestic
peace," 90 "strangl[ing] the free mind at its source" refutes the very es-
sence of the First Amendment. 91 The majority opinion in Tinker cap-
tures and heeds both of these concerns, whereas, the dissenting opin-
ion only addresses the former. Although Justice Black's dissent has
been characterized by some as being prophetic, it has only contrib-
uted to the denigration of speech the First Amendment was designed
to protect.92 The Supreme Court has embarked on a slippery slope,
and if student-freedom-of-speech cases continue in this direction,
student rights will be left at the schoolhouse gate. The Tinker Court
aimed to prevent schools from becoming "enclaves of totalitarian-
ism" and students from becoming "closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the State chooses to communicate. 93 However, despite
the Tinker Court's efforts, the reality appears that it is only a matter
of time before students are wearing identical clothes, thinking the
same thoughts, and speaking only ideas that are officially approved.
The implications of these decisions are disconcerting and frightening.
B. Tinker Provided the Appropriate Balance
The standard set forth by the Tinker Court to determine
whether students' First Amendment rights were violated, provided
that "where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the
forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
90 Id. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 507 (majority opinion).
92 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained. 94 The standard asserted
by the Court appears to be analogous to intermediate scrutiny used
for equal protection analysis. The language used by the Court, pri-
marily the words "materially" and "substantially," denote the disrup-
tion must be significant. 95  The Tinker Court most likely reasoned
that a rational relation standard accorded too much deference to
school officials, whereas strict scrutiny would provide students with
too much leeway, thereby enabling them to control the school.
Tinker's mid-tier intermediate scrutiny, however, struck the proper
balance. The "material and substantial disruption" standard is pliable
and capable of encompassing all forms of student-speech had the Su-
preme Court defined the parameters of what was meant by "material"
and "substantial" instead of leaving the schools and lower courts to
inconsistently interpret the meaning.96
Tinker provides a flexible, well-reasoned standard that
achieves the appropriate balance by allowing students to exercise
their right to freedom of speech and schools to maintain order.97
94 Id. at 509 (citing Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).
" See id. at 509.
96 Guiles, 461 F.3d at 326.
Tinker [is not] entirely clear as to what constitutes "substantial disorder"
or "substantial disruption" of or "material interference" with school ac-
tivities. The opinion alludes to "threats [and] acts of violence on school
premises," but does not otherwise explain what might qualify as "mate-
rially and substantially disrupt[ing] the work and discipline of the
school."
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 529 ("Unlike the
Supreme Court, lower federal courts have not followed a consistent pattern over the last
thirty years. Some cases have been remarkably protective of student speech, while others
have been highly deferential to schools regulating [student] expression.").
97 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2635-36 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that Tinker cre-
ated a pliable standard); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 545-46 (explaining that the
majority opinion in Tinker was successful in achieving a balance that provided students with
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Therefore, it is plausible that Fraser, Kuhimeier, and Morse are un-
necessary additions to First Amendment jurisprudence and could
have been decided under the framework of Tinker. Upon a thorough
reading of Fraser, Kuhimeier, and Morse, it becomes evident that the
Court's underlying motive was to distance itself from the standard set
forth in Tinker.98 Instead of creating exceptions to Tinker, the Court
should have used Fraser and Kuhlmeier to clarify First Amendment
jurisprudence by defining and reaffirming the standard set forth in
Tinker. For example, the Court in Fraser could have held that "of-
fensive" speech delivered at a school assembly constitutes a "material
and substantial disruption." The Court in Kuhlmeier could have held
that speech which can reasonably be regarded as school-sponsored,
when disseminated, constitutes a "material and substantial disrup-
tion." Had the Supreme Court formulated the opinions of Fraser and
Kuhimeier, respectively, in this manner, it would in essence have
molded and defined the parameters of what constitutes a "substantial
and material disruption." 99 Not only would this have avoided the
creation of miscellaneous and incongruent exceptions, but it would
have provided for a more consistent and reliable interpretation of
Tinker's holding.
the ability to exercise their First Amendment rights and school officials' the ability to restrict
those rights).
98 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272-73 ("[Wle conclude that the standard articulated in
Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the
standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dis-
semination of student expression."); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 ("The undoubted freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.").
99 See Guiles, 461 F.3d at 326 ("The [Tinker] opinion alludes to 'threats [and] acts of vio-
lence on school premises,' but does not otherwise explain what might qualify as 'materially
and substantially disrupt[ing] the work and discipline of the school.' ").
760 [Vol. 25
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Thirty-eight years later in Morse, it is interesting to observe
the increasing amount of deference accorded to school officials re-
sulting from the Supreme Court's furtive alteration of the Tinker
standard.'00 When Tinker was decided, the standard appeared to be
somewhat analogous to intermediate scrutiny. However in Morse,
the Court altered its previous interpretations stating, "Tinker held that
student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials rea-
sonably conclude that it will 'materially and substantially disrupt the
work and discipline of the school.' "0 Appearing in the language is
the word "reasonably," implying a rational basis standard. 10 2  This
means the school or school official simply needs to establish a rea-
sonable belief the conduct in question will cause a disruption to sup-
press it. This rational basis form of deference is suitable when deal-
ing with economic rights of the sort involved in a Due Process or
Equal Protection challenge. However, the vast deference accorded to
school officials is improper when fundamental constitutional rights
are at stake. 10 3  Deference of this magnitude inevitably leads to
abuse.' 0 4 It is the job of the courts, not the schools, to interpret the
'0' See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626.
101 Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513) (emphasis added).
102 See id.
103 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I recognize that the school ad-
ministration must be given wide latitude to determine what forms of conduct are inconsistent
with the school's educational mission; nevertheless, where speech is involved, we may not
unquestioningly accept a teacher's or administrator's assertion that certain pure speech inter-
fered with education.").
104 See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 546.
School officials-like all government officials-often will want to sup-
press or punish speech because it makes them feel uncomfortable, is
critical of them, or just because they do not like it. The judiciary has a
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Constitution. The deference the Court has accorded to the school has
essentially eliminated judicial review since the Court will defer to the
"reasonable judgment" of the school officials.'05
The Court's increasing deference to school districts and
school officials is evinced by the decisions in Fraser, Kuhimeier, and
Morse. The rationale for the abundant amount of deference is that
the Supreme Court is not suited to make decisions concerning institu-
tions with which it has little knowledge.10 6 This argument, however,
is unavailing since "judges always adjudicate cases in fields alien to
them, including 'accounting partnerships; administrative law judge-
ships; law enforcement; engineering; computer programming; and
hard sciences such as chemistry.' "107 The reason why schools have
won every case to reach the Supreme Court since Tinker can be easily
explained by the deferential standards which have been applied to
student speech cases. 0 8 It appears as though school officials may ad-
vance any reason for curtailing student speech, so long at it is reason-
able. Provided this reasonableness requirement is met, the Court will
defer to the school official's judgment, reasoning they are in the best
position to make such a determination, not the Justices of the Court
Id.
105 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106 See id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Local school boards, not the courts, should
determine what pedagogical interests are 'legitimate' and what rules 'reasonably relat[e]' to
those interests."). See also Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners-Oh My! A
Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54
UCLA L. REv. 1635, 1658 (2007).
107 Moss, supra note 106, at 1666-67 (citing Scott A. Moss, Against "Academic Defer-
ence ": How Recent Developments in Employment Discrimination Law Undercut an Already
Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6-7 (2006)).
108 See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 527-28 ("Over the three decades of the Burger and
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who are granted life-long terms.
The Court in Morse was so reluctant to find in favor of the
student that it preferred to create another exception to the standard
pronounced in Tinker instead of deciding the case under Tinker's
framework.10 9 Had the Court analyzed Frederick's banner under
Tinker, the case would have had a very different outcome since the
speech at issue did not cause a "material or substantial disruption."
Cognizant of this, the Supreme Court, seeking to defer to the deter-
mination made by school authorities, created another exception to
Tinker, which permitted school officials to circumscribe speech that
could "reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use."1"10
Schools should not be granted unbridled authority to censor speech,
especially speech that strikes at the core of what the First Amend-
ment was implemented to protect.
It appears as though it is only a matter of time before the
Court constrains the holding of Tinker even further, making Tinker
the exception instead of the rule to be applied in student speech cases.
The Supreme Court may accomplish this goal in one of several ways:
(1) extending Fraser's application to include speech that offends a
school's educational mission;111 (2) holding that Tinker applies only
to speech that is political; 1 2 or (3) creating additional exceptions to
'09 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 ("[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal
drug use.").
110 Id.
111 See Boroffv. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that school officials may censor speech they deem to contravene the school's educational
mission).
112 See Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 391-93 (6th Cir. 2005); Ca-
nady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2001); and Bar-Navon v. Sch.
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Tinker, thereby eviscerating the rule altogether.' 1 3
IV. THE DANGERS INHERENT IN MORSE V. FREDERICK
A. Disciplining Students for Activities Occurring Off-
Campus
The law governing public forums is well-settled. However, in
Morse the Supreme Court determined that standards governing stu-
dent speech trump those governing public forums.' 14 Had this con-
clusion not been reached the Court would have sided with Frederick,
since he was on a public street-which has been defined as a "quin-
tessential public forum"-when he unfurled his banner. 1 5 The Court
circumvents the rules pertaining to traditional public forums by label-
ing the event as a school-sanctioned activity." 6 Concurring in the
judgment of Fraser, Justice Brennan stated, "[i]f [the student] had
given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could
not have been penalized simply because government officials consid-
ered his language to be inappropriate." ' 1 7 The same reasoning should
apply in Morse, since technically Frederick was not on school
grounds and was far removed from the school environment. How-
ever, in an effort to suppress the silent, passive speech at issue in
Bd. of Brevard County, No. 6:06-cv-1434-Orl-19KRS (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2007), 2007 WL
3284322, at *7 for a discussion of how Tinker's protection extends only to viewpoint dis-
crimination.
"' See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622, 2629; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271; Fraser, 478 U.S. at
685.
114 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37,45 (1983).
115 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
116 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
117 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Morse, the school district extended the boundaries through which it
may permissibly discipline students to include off-campus, albeit
school-sanctioned activities, taking place on a public street. 18 Al-
though there have been numerous cases addressing student speech
that occurs off-campus which is subsequently brought on campus,
there is scant authority on the issue of what constitutes a school-
sanctioned event.' 9 The fact that the Olympic Torch Relay occurred
off-campus is incontrovertible. However, instead of defining the
permissible boundaries of school discipline, the Supreme Court cir-
cuitously avoided the issue by labeling the event as a school-
sanctioned event, and disposed of the case by creating an additional
exception to Tinker.'
20
B. Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board
There has been much debate over how far the school's disci-
plinary authority extends, which is why it has been argued that the
Supreme Court should have used Morse as an opportunity to clarify
the conflicting case law. 12 1 Since the issue has never been addressed
by the Supreme Court, Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board
122
continues to be the benchmark case that discusses the various stan-
118 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
19 See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Boucher v. Sch.
Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973).
120 Morse, 127 . Ct. at 2624, 2629.
121 Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Frustrated
by ... inconsistencies, commentators have begun calling for courts to more clearly delineate
the boundary line between off-campus speech entitled to greater First Amendment protec-
tion, and on-campus speech subject to greater regulation.").
122 Id. at 614-621.
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dards utilized to determine whether a student may be disciplined for
conduct that takes place off-campus. 123 The Supreme Court in Morse
even cited to Porter after concluding the Olympic Torch Relay was a
school-sanctioned activity, stating "[t]here is some uncertainty at the
outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech prece-
dents." 
12 4
In Porter, a student drew a picture in a sketchpad of his
school under attack by various armaments coupled with vulgarities
and racial epithets. 125 Additionally, the sketch made references to the
student's high school principal using derogatory remarks and de-
picted a brick being thrown at him. 26 The sketch-which was cre-
ated by the student while he was at home-was kept in a closet until
two years later when his younger brother unwittingly brought the
sketchpad to school. 127 While riding the bus home, the drawing was
brought to the attention of the bus driver who confiscated the sketch-
pad and alerted school authorities of the incident.' 28 The student who
sketched the drawing two years prior was removed from school, rec-
ommended for expulsion, and arrested for terrorizing the school.
129
Waiving his right to a high school disciplinary hearing, the student
enrolled in an alternative school program within the same district. 3 °
Despite being given the option to re-enroll at his former high school
123 Id.
124 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.




129 Id. at 612.
131 Porter, 393 F.3d at 612.
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the following academic year, the student decided to drop out.'
3'
Subsequently, the student's mother filed suit in district
court. 32  Summary judgment was entered on behalf of the school
board after the court found the sketch did not warrant First Amend-
ment protection. 133 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded the sketch
did not qualify as student speech. 134  The court reasoned that the
"drawing was completed in [the student's] home, stored for two
years, and never intended by him to be brought to campus. He took
no action that would increase the chances that his drawing would find
its way to school."' 135 The court entered into a detailed discussion re-
garding the standard to be used when off-campus speech ends up on-
campus.136 The Fifth Circuit took note of the divisiveness among the
courts that have dealt with this issue; and mentioned how some courts
use Tinker's substantial disruption analysis, while other courts cate-
gorically provide First Amendment protection so long as the speaker
did not facilitate the speech's dissemination on campus.1 37 Still, other
courts use a variety or combination of student-speech standards.1
38
To dispose of the issue, the court utilized a unique bifurcated
standard. 139 First, the court analyzed whether the drawing could be
131 Id.
132 Id.
113 Id. at 612-13.
134 Id. at 615 ("Given the unique facts of the present case, we decline to find that [the stu-
dent's] drawing constitutes student speech on school premises.").
135 Porter, 393 F.3d at 615.
136 Id. at 615-20.
131 Id. at 619.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 616-18, 620. The Court first analyzed whether the sketch constituted a true
threat and then considered whether the sketch was directed at the campus. Id.
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characterized as a "true threat."'' 40 The court explained the govern-
ment is authorized under the First Amendment to ban speech deemed
"a true threat of violence."1 41 "Speech is a 'true threat' and therefore,
unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would interpret the
speech as a 'serious expression of an intent to cause a present or fu-
ture harm.' ,,142 The speaker forfeits First Amendment protection
when the speech is "intentionally or knowingly communicated to ei-
ther the object of the threat or a third person."'' 43 Finding the sketch
did not meet the criteria of a true threat, the court then analyzed
whether the speech was "directed at the campus." 144 Considering nu-
merous factors, the court held that since the student's drawing was
created off-campus, shown only to his own family, kept in a closet
for two years, and was not intentionally brought by him to his high
school or disseminated in a way that would cause it to reach his high
school, the drawing was entitled to First Amendment protection. 
145
It is questionable whether the Supreme Court in Morse ap-
plied the correct or most appropriate standard when determining
whether Frederick's banner was entitled to protection under the First
Amendment. Perhaps the Supreme Court should have applied the
reasonable foreseeability standard utilized in Porter to determine
whether Frederick's speech was directed at the campus. Considering
the irreconcilable case law addressing the extent to which a school's
140 Porter, 393 F.3d at 616-18.
141 Id. at 616.
142 Id. at n.25 (quoting Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th
Cir. 2002)).
143 Id. at n.26 (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)) (emphasis added).
'44 Id. at618,620.
145 Porter, 393 F.3d at 620.
768 [Vol. 25
30
Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 2, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss2/12
STUDENT RIGHTS UP IN SMOKE
authority extends beyond campus, it is no surprise the Supreme Court
decided to avoid the issue of off-campus speech altogether. The Su-
preme Court chose to dispose of Morse with administrative ease and
efficiency by creating a new exception, rather than clarify an unset-
tled area of law. Furthermore, the Court was insistent upon deferring
to the determination of the principal and proscribing the speech on
Frederick's banner. The only way the Court could reach this desired
result was to create a new exception to Tinker. It is axiomatic that if
Tinker's standard was applied to the facts of Morse, Frederick would
have prevailed since his banner did not cause a material and substan-
tial disruption. The Court in Tinker unequivocally opined that stu-
dents' First Amendment rights extend beyond the classroom.
146
Moreover, the Olympic Torch Relay was an extracurricular activity
and student attendance was voluntary. Regulating and censoring cer-
tain forms of speech in a school setting where student attendance is
mandatory is understandable and necessary to maintain order. How-
ever, banning non-disruptive speech made by an adult, at a public
event, on a public street, works a manifest injustice on the First
Amendment.
The danger inherent in Morse is that it is only a matter of time
before the dicta inherent in the Court's analysis is used to suppress
speech made off-campus. Morse advances the proposition that not
only may schools regulate speech which can "reasonably be regarded
as encouraging illegal drug use," but that schools may do so regard-
less of where the speech takes place. The decision in Morse will un-
146 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
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doubtedly lead school authorities to place additional restrictions on
student speech even for activities occurring off campus; it may be re-
lied on as supporting authority. 
147
C. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport
Central School District
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central
School District148 reveals the dangers of extending student speech
precedents to include conduct that takes place off-campus. In
Wisniewski, a student was suspended for an entire semester as a result
of creating a "buddy icon" on America Online's instant messaging
program which depicted "a pistol firing a bullet at a person's head,
above which were dots representing splattered blood."' 149 Intending
the figure in the drawing to represent his English teacher, the student
wrote the words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen" underneath the image.15°
The "buddy icon" was created by the student and transmitted to sev-
eral "buddies" on the student's "buddy list" while he was at home on
his parents' computer. 151 Despite the fact that the icon was intended
to be a joke and the incident took place off-campus, the superinten-
dent concluded the drawing was sufficient to constitute a threat which
"was in violation of school rules and disrupted school operations by
requiring special attention from school officials, replacement of the
147 See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 430 ("By allowing schools to punish speech when
there is no evidence of disruption or other harm, Morse likely will be read by school admin-
istrators and lower courts as permitting much more government regulation of student
speech.").
14' 494 F.3d. 34 (2d Cir. 2007).





Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 2, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss2/12
STUDENT RIGHTS UP IN SMOKE
threatened teacher, and interviewing pupils during class time.' 5 2
Addressing whether the student could be disciplined for con-
duct that occurred off-campus, the Second Circuit looked to Morse
for guidance.153 The court stated that:
Since the Supreme Court in Morse rejected the claim
that the student's location, standing across the street
from the school at a school approved event with a ban-
ner visible to most students, was not "at school," it had
no occasion to consider the circumstances under
which school authorities may discipline students for
off-campus activities. 14
Since Morse failed to address the issue, the Second Circuit was split
regarding "whether it must be shown that it was reasonably foresee-
able that [the student's] IM icon would reach the school property or
whether the undisputed fact that it did reach the school pretermits any
inquiry as to this aspect of reasonable foreseeability."'' 55 Despite be-
ing divided, the court concluded it was reasonably foreseeable the
speech in question would reach the school's premises.1 56 Upholding
the student's suspension, the court proceeded to analyze the facts of
the case under Tinker and found the student's conduct caused a "sub-
stantial disruption.' ' 157 The court opined that "[t]hese consequences
permit school discipline, whether or not [the student] intended his IM
152 Id.
' Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 ("The fact that [the student's] creation and transmission of
the IM icon occurred away from school property does not necessarily insulate him from
school discipline.").
154 Id. n.3 (citing Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623-24) (internal citations omitted).
"' Id. at 39.
156 Id. at 39-40.
117 Id. at 40.
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icon to be communicated to school authorities or, if communicated,
to cause a substantial disruption."'
' 58
D. Doninger v. Niehoff
Doninger v. Niehoff,159 is also illustrative of the dangers in-
herent in Morse's holding. Doninger is very similar to Wisniewski,
and actually relies upon that court's holding for support. 60 In Don-
inger, a student was prohibited from running in the election for Sen-
ior Class Secretary as the result of a derogatory blog entry directed at
school officials which she posted on an Internet website.161 It is im-
portant to note that the blog entry was not composed on a school
computer or during school hours, but rather was written while the
student was home late in the evening. 62 Subsequently, the student's
mother filed suit on behalf of her daughter. 63 She alleged various
constitutional violations and sought to enjoin the decision of the
school officials.
164
Reviewing the likelihood of success of the student's First
Amendment claims, the court conceded the speech occurred off-
campus, thereby rendering Fraser inapposite to the matter at issue.
65
However, it circumvented this reasoning and dismissed the point by
stating the speech "was purposely designed by [the student] to come
.58 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
59 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
160 Id. at216-17.
161 Id. at 207-08.
162 Id. at 206.
163 Id. at 202.
164 Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
165 Id. at 216.
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onto the campus." ' 116 The court held that "[u]nder Wisniewski... the
Court believes that [the student's] blog entry may be considered on-
campus speech for the purposes of the First Amendment., 167 Al-
though the court did not articulate which student-speech standard
should govern the facts of the case, the court concluded that "Fraser
and Morse teach that school officials could permissibly punish [the
student] in the way that they did for her offensive speech."'
168
V. REMEDYING THE INCONSISTENCY AMONG THE LOWER
COURTS
In order to eliminate the confusion among the lower courts
deciding student-speech cases, clear and precise lines must be drawn
by the Supreme Court. 16 9 First and foremost, a distinction must be
made between speech that takes place on campus and speech that
takes place off-campus. If the speech takes place on campus, then
undoubtedly student-speech precedents should apply. However, if
the speech takes place off-campus, greater protection should be ac-
corded to the student, and the regulation should be evaluated using a
more exacting form of scrutiny unless the speech qualifies as a "true
threat." The courts should implement a two-step analysis. First, the
court should consider whether it is "reasonably foreseeable" that the
speech in question would reach the campus. In other words, the court
must determine whether the speech was directed at the campus. If
166 Id.
167 Id. at 217.
168 Id.
169 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that student-speech ju-
risprudence is confusing and difficult to interpret).
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the answer to the first inquiry is in the affirmative, then the court
should examine the constitutionality of the regulation utilizing
Tinker, and only uphold the regulation if the speech created a mate-
rial and substantial disruption on campus. 170 However, if the answer
to the first inquiry is in the negative, then there should be a presump-
tion that the regulation is unconstitutional, thus placing the burden on
the school district to demonstrate the regulation is narrowly tailored
to effectuate a compelling pedagogical interest.
171
Secondly, although Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse cannot be
erased from student speech jurisprudence, their application must be
limited to their respective purposes as opposed to being augmented to
censor more speech than was originally intended. Therefore, Fraser
should not be read to suppress speech that offends a school's educa-
tional mission, but rather should be utilized only to censor speech that
is lewd, vulgar, and obscene. Kuhlmeier should only be used to ban
inappropriate forms of speech that can reasonably be perceived as
endorsed by the school. Morse, which purportedly applies solely to
speech advocating illegal drug use, must be interpreted narrowly to
allow commentary and political or social debate on controversial is-
sues. Lastly, Tinker should be interpreted broadly and treated as the
"catch-all" standard that applies to all student-speech not falling un-
der Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.
170 See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40.
171 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050-52, for the proposition that students should receive full
First Amendment protection for speech taking place off-campus.
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A. Inconsistent Application of Fraser
Despite having the opportunity to elucidate all student-speech
jurisprudence in Morse, the Supreme Court only found it necessary to
refine Fraser. The Supreme Court's decision in Fraser has been in-
correctly interpreted and impermissibly expanded by numerous lower
courts.'72 These courts have expanded Fraser's application to in-
clude speech that offends the school's educational mission.'73 The
danger inherent in this argument is that if speech can be suppressed
simply because it is incompatible with the school's mission, then
schools can manipulate their educational missions to proscribe any
viewpoint with which it disagrees. 74 In Morse, the Supreme Court
took note of the ambiguity present in Fraser.7 5 Attempting to clarify
its previous decision, the Court opined that Fraser "should not be
read to encompass any speech that could fit under some definition of
'offensive.' ,,176 This pronouncement by the Supreme Court un-
equivocally restricts Fraser's application to vulgar, lewd, and inde-
cent speech.
B. Inconsistent Application of Tinker
Although this Article advances the proposition that Tinker
should be the standard applied in all student-speech cases, it must be
172 See, e.g., Boroff, 220 F.3d at 469-72 (holding that a T-shirt depicting an image of
Marilyn Manson coupled with other anti-religious messages was offensive pursuant to Fra-
ser since it contravened the school's educational and anti-drug missions).
173 Id. at 470.
174 See Morse 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the dangers posed by
the "educational mission" argument).
171 Id. at 2626, 2629 (majority opinion).
176 Id. at 2629.
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noted the standard is far from perfect. The lower court decisions are
inconsistent concerning the scope of Tinker's application. Some
courts read Tinker narrowly and only utilize the material and substan-
tial disruption standard when a school district engages in political
viewpoint-based discrimination; whereas other courts read Tinker
broadly, reasoning that it applies to all student speech not falling un-
der any of the other exceptions. 77 In Morse, the Supreme Court
failed to articulate which application of Tinker is correct. As stated
previously, to achieve uniformity among the courts, Tinker should be
interpreted as the "catch-all" standard that applies when the other ex-
ceptions are inapposite.
The standard enunciated in Tinker is also deficient because
the Supreme Court never defined exactly what constitutes a "material
and substantial disruption." By defining this terminology, the Su-
preme Court could effectively provide the lower courts more guid-
ance when rendering decisions. To determine whether speech causes
a "material and substantial disruption," the courts should implement a
factor-based approach. Factors the court should look to when deter-
mining whether speech constitutes a material and substantial disrup-
tion include: (1) whether class time was disrupted as a result of the
1' See Guiles, 461 F.3d at 326 ("It is not entirely clear whether Tinker's rule applies to all
student speech that is not sponsored by schools, subject to the rule of Fraser, or whether it
applies only to political speech or to political viewpoint-based discrimination."). See also
Bar-Navon, 2007 WL 3284322, at *5, stating:
Courts disagree ... as to the broader question of whether the legal stan-
dard in Tinker is applicable more generally to all regulation of student
speech and not simply speech that expresses a particularized view. In
other words, the dispute involves whether there should be a distinction
between school speech regulation that is viewpoint-hostile and school
conduct regulation that only incidentally burdens student expression.
[Vol. 25
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conduct in question; (2) whether the students' school day was altered
due to the conduct; (3) how severely the students were affected by the
conduct; (4) the size of the student population that was affected; and
(5) the age of the students subjected to the speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether Morse is relied upon to accord more
deference to the determination of school officials, or to extend the
holding of Fraser to include speech that offends a school's educa-
tional mission, or provide schools the authority to censor speech oc-
curring off-campus; it is clear the holding and pronouncement in
Tinker, that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," has been oblit-
erated. 178 The notion that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools" has long since been discarded17 9 Although at one point in
time Tinker provided the overarching standard to be applied in stu-
dent speech cases, in recent years it has been reduced to a narrow ex-
ception, and is now collecting dust on the Supreme Court's shelf. It
appears that at present, the predominant standard is one of judicial
deference. A court faced with a student freedom of speech issue will
capriciously determine which category of deferential exceptions the
facts of a given case fit into. Clearly, and maybe unfortunately, it has
"'8 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 546 ("Simply put, thirty[-
nine] years after Tinker, students do leave most of their First Amendment rights at the
schoolhouse gate.").
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many to choose from. Additionally, it is alarming that if the Supreme
Court cannot suppress the speech at issue because it fails to cause a
substantial disruption and does not fall under any of the exceptions to
Tinker, the Court will simply create another exception. This deferen-
tial approach taken by the Court in Morse, and other post-Tinker
cases, is certain to continue to have a snowball effect. There is a high
probability that additional exceptions will be created in the future. At
one point in time, student rights were summarized by the oft-stated
maxim that "the First Amendment gives a high school student the
classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket
[which read 'Fuck the Draft']."'' ° However, considering the current
status of First Amendment jurisprudence, this maxim has failed to
keep pace with the times and must be altered to incorporate the nu-
merous exceptions. Today, the First Amendment also prohibits Fra-
ser's sexually suggestive speech, publishing Kuhimeier's unedited
newspaper, and unfurling Frederick's controversial banner.
It appears as though the Supreme Court has implicitly ruled
the First Amendment is inapplicable; it fails to protect those who
have not reached the age of majority, adhering to the antediluvian no-
tion that "children are to be seen not heard."' 8'1 The Court, by dimin-
ishing the protection granted to students through the First Amend-
ment, has completely disregarded the fact that "[s]tudents in school
as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution."'82 As
Justice Stevens stated in Morse, "it is the expression of the minority's
180 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1057).
... See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 511.
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viewpoint that most demands the protection of the First Amend-
ment." 183 Although speech that does fall within the majority's scope
may cause trepidation, "our Constitution says we must take this risk,
and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom ... that
is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and
vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permis-
sive, often disputatious, society."
'1 84
"' Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 (internal citations omitted).
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